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YOUR COACH IS WATCHING: CAN A HIGH 
SCHOOL REGULATE ITS STUDENT-
ATHLETES’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA? 
LAUREN E. ROSENBAUM** 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Imagine your high school coach sitting next to you as you socialize after 
school at the local coffee shop, joining you at your weekend sleepover with your 
teammates, or scrutinizing your intimate conversations with your best friend.  
Then, imagine being punished for the conduct your coach witnessed.  In today’s 
world of social media, high school coaches do just that. Not only do coaches 
and other school officials monitor student-athletes’ social media usage, but they 
punish these individuals for their conduct. 
 High schools may not merely act pursuant to their whims and desires 
when implementing regulations regarding student-athletes’ use of social media. 
Public high schools are subject to the constitutional constraints of the First 
Amendment’s right to free speech. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, stu-
dents retain some of their First Amendment rights when under school control.1  
Therefore, schools must be cognizant of the restraints presented by the First 
Amendment, Tinker, and other jurisprudence when determining if they will reg-
ulate their student-athletes’ social media use.2 
 This Comment will discuss whether a public high school can regulate its 
student-athletes’ usage of social media.  First, it will discuss issues that arise 
regarding a public high school’s regulation of its student-athletes’ social media 
                                                          
* This Comment won the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School’s 2014 
National Sports Law Student Writing Competition. 
** Third-year law student and Sports Law Certificate candidate at Marquette University Law 
School, and M.B.A. student concentrating on Sports Business at Marquette University Graduate School 
of Management.  The author would like to thank her husband, Alex, and dogs, Kacee Berry and Bran-
son, for their love and continued support.  The author would like to dedicate this Comment to her 
Grandfather, Robert, and thank him for teaching her how to logically (and forcefully) argue and inspir-
ing her to achieve greatness. 
1 See generally 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
2 See generally id.  
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use.  Next, it will review the legal precedent regarding students’ First Amend-
ment right to free speech, using each case to pinpoint types of speech a school 
can legally regulate and punish.  Finally, it will provide an overview of whether 
a public high school may regulate its student-athletes’ speech occurring via so-
cial media without violating the First Amendment, as well as the types of speech 
a school may regulate when taking into account where the speech occurs. 
II.  HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Public high schools face difficulties when attempting to regulate its stu-
dents’ speech occurring through social media because it often occurs outside of 
school.  Today, social networking sites, such as Facebook, Google Plus, Twitter, 
and blogs, are widely available and easily accessible to high school students.3  
Currently, high schools across the nation are dealing with the conundrum of 
whether they can legally regulate and punish their students’ social media usage 
and whether they will do so.4  This dilemma extends to the schools’ student-
athletes.5 
With the increased availability and use of various forms of social media, 
high schools have begun regulating their students’ posts on these platforms.6  
Some current social media policies for high school students prohibit “malicious 
use, demeaning statements, threats, incriminating photo[graphs or] statements, 
hazing, sexual harassment, vandalism, stalking, underage drinking, [and] illegal 
drug use.”7  Others prohibit conduct that is “unbecoming” of a student-athlete.8  
However, the question remains as to whether these current regulations violate 
student-athletes’ First Amendment right to free speech.9 
                                                          
3 See generally Travis Jarome, Positive Utilization of Social Networking, NFHS.COM, 
https://www.nfhs.org/media/865861/wkshp-39-innskeep-jarome.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2014); Paul 
D. Mengold, Appropriate Use of Electronic Media by Coaches, NFHS.COM, http://www.nfhs.org/me-
dia/868971/WS23%20and%2029%20(Mengold).pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
4 See generally Lee E. Green, Sports Law Issues in School Athletic Programs, MSADA-MD.ORG, 
http://www.msada-
md.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/NIAAA%202011%20Closing%20General%20Session%20-
%20Social%20Media%20Law.ppt (last visited Nov. 20, 2014); Jim Inskeep, Positive Utilization of So-
cial Media and Strategies for Your Athletic Department, https://www.nfhs.org/media/865861/wkshp-
39-innskeep-jarome.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2014); Jarome, supra note 7; Mengold, supra note 7. 
5 See generally Green, supra note 4; Inskeep, supra note 4; Jarome, supra note 3; Mengold, supra 
note 3. 
6 See Jarome, supra note 3. 
7 Id. See generally Green, supra note 4. 
8 See Inskeep, supra note 4. 
9 See generally Green, supra note 4; Jarome, supra note 3. 
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III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 
Because public high schools are state actors, they must act in accordance 
with the First Amendment of the Constitution.10  Jurisprudence regarding free 
speech in public high schools has addressed various mediums of speech, while 
consistently applying the fundamental principles articulated in Tinker to largely 
protect student speech.  Because students continue to allege that public high 
schools have violated their First Amendment rights, a school’s permissible reg-
ulation of its student-athletes’ speech continues to be at issue.   
A.  Regulation of High School Students’ Speech 
In certain circumstances, public high schools may regulate the general stu-
dent population’s speech without violating the First Amendment.  In general, 
courts have separated speech into three categories: (1) speech causing or creat-
ing a reasonably foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption to the school envi-
ronment; (2) vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive speech; or (3) school-
sponsored speech.11   
1.  The Tinker Standard: Substantial Disruption  
In general, a public high school may regulate a general student’s speech 
occurring at school or off-school grounds if the speech involved is substantially 
disruptive to the school environment.12  The fundamental United States Su-
preme Court decision regarding students’ right to free speech is Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.13  In this case, high school stu-
dents were suspended for wearing armbands to school to show their disapproval 
of the Vietnam conflict after the defendants, various school officials, imple-
mented a policy prohibiting the protest.14  The Court found the display was not 
“actually or potentially disruptive” to the school environment.15  Further, the 
Court went on to posit that a school must show “its action was caused by some-
thing more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint” when prohibiting student speech.16  
The Court determined that without a sufficient reason for regulating students’ 
                                                          
10 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
11 Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992). 
12 See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 504. 
15 Id. at 505. 
16 Id. at 509.   
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speech, schools must allow students to speak freely because schools are a “‛mar-
ketplace of ideas,’” a place for the dissemination of various thoughts.17   
The Court noted that the speech involved was a “silent, passive expression 
of opinion.”18  This characterization distinguished the speech from cases in 
which the behavior caused a disruption to the school environment—an instance 
in which a school may regulate student speech.19  Because students are still en-
titled to First Amendment rights within the school setting, the Court found the 
prohibition and punishment of the speech to be a violation of the students’ First 
Amendment right to free speech.20  Further, the Court determined the conduct 
did not “intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others,” creating a substantial 
disruption; therefore, punishment of the speech was a violation of the students’ 
First Amendment right to free speech.21   
This landmark decision established that students are still entitled to their 
First Amendment free speech rights, albeit limited in some respects, while 
within the confines of a school.22  However, in more modern cases involving 
rampant retweeting or reposting of social media messages that invade the 
school, the outcome may be different because of the potential for the substantial 
disruption to the school environment.23  Regardless, Tinker provides the pivotal 
starting point—substantial disruption of the school environment—in analyzing 
public high school students’ right to free speech pursuant to the First Amend-
ment.24 
a. Interpretation of the Tinker Standard  
Although not all decided by the United States Supreme Court, subsequent 
cases have further defined the Court’s substantial disruption standard in the con-
                                                          
17 Id. at 511–12 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (discussing the 
importance of sharing ideas because students are the nation’s future).   
18 Id. at 508. 
19 See generally supra Part II.A. 
20 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.  
21 Id. at 514.  The Ninth Circuit examined a similar issue regarding the use of the word “scab” on 
various buttons and stickers worn by students in support of striking teachers.  Chandler v. McMinnville 
Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing the district court’s dismissal of the students’ 
case for failure to state a claim). 
22 See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
23 This type of speech would likely be examined under the substantial disruption test described in 
this section.  
24 See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
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text of the school’s interest in maintaining “‘order and a proper educational en-
vironment.’”25  Generally, the nature of the disruption must cause “‘a specific 
and significant fear of disruption, not just some remote apprehension of disturb-
ance’” to be substantial under the standard set forth in Tinker.26   
 i. In-School Speech  
In the United States Supreme Court case Morse v. Frederick, the plaintiff, 
Joseph Frederick, a high school senior, displayed a banner at a school-sanc-
tioned event that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”27  Based upon the student’s 
conduct and his refusal to takedown the banner, the principal suspended him 
and confiscated the banner.28  The plaintiff sued, alleging the punishment vio-
lated his First Amendment right to free speech.29  However, the Court held that 
the punishment did not violate the First Amendment, characterizing the plain-
tiff’s speech as in-school speech because it occurred at a school-sanctioned 
event.30  In making its determination, the Court noted the important interest 
schools have in deterring illegal drug use, pointing to its immense impact on the 
high school environment.31  The interest of curbing drug use coupled with the 
perceived potential disruption to the school environment composed the basis of 
the Court’s decision.32   
In LaVine v. Blaine School District, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a pub-
lic high school’s emergency expulsion of a student was not a violation of his 
First Amendment rights, but the placement of a letter in his student file detailing 
the incident was.33  The student wrote a poem entitled Last Words, depicting 
murder and suicide.34  He gave the poem to his English teacher to review and 
provide feedback.35  The student sued alleging his punishment violated his First 
                                                          
25 Kayleigh R. Mayer, Comment, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter: Constitutional Implica-
tions of Regulating and Monitoring Student-Athletes’ Twitter Usage, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 455, 
464 (2013) (quoting Autumn K. Leslie, Note, Online Social Networks and Restrictions on College Ath-
letes: Student Censorship?, 5 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 27 (2008)). 
26 Id. (citations omitted); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
27 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
28 Id. at 396. 
29 Id. at 399. 
30 Id. at 397, 410. 
31 Id. at 407. 
32 Id. at 408. 
33 See generally 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001). 
34 Id. at 983–84. 
35 Id. at 984. 
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Amendment right to free speech.36  In discussing its decision, the court noted 
that it grants educators “substantial deference” in determining when speech is 
inappropriate.37  The court found that the emergency expulsion did not violate 
the student’s First Amendment rights because the school could reasonably pre-
dict the speech would cause a substantial disruption to the school environment 
based upon a consideration of the totality of the circumstances, i.e. his previous 
suicidal thoughts, family problems, recent break up and alleged stalking of his 
ex-girlfriend, and past disciplinary problems.38  Conversely, the letter placed in 
his file was a violation of his First Amendment right because a permanent doc-
umentation of the incident that would potentially cause harm to him in the future 
was not needed, given that he was no longer a threat to himself or others.39  
Overall, the school was able to permissibly regulate the student’s speech during 
the period in which it may have caused a substantial disruption.40  However, as 
soon as that time had passed, the necessity of regulation was no longer war-
ranted; therefore, continued regulation constituted a violation of his First 
Amendment right.41   
Based upon the foregoing case law, a public high school may regulate its 
students’ speech that causes or potentially creates a substantial disruption to the 
school environment.  In-school speech includes speech occurring at off-ground, 
school-sponsored events, such as field trips and athletic events.42  Speech char-
acterized as promoting illicit drug use, fighting words, or threats occurring in-
school may also be regulated without violating the First Amendment.  Accord-
ingly, a public high school may regulate its students’ speech occurring in-school 
that does or is reasonably likely to create a substantial disruption. 
 ii. Out-of-School Speech   
In Fenton v. Stear, the plaintiff, Jeffrey Lynn Fenton, a high school student, 
brought an action against the defendants, various employees of the school dis-
trict, for violating his First Amendment right to free speech when the school 
suspended him and prohibited him from attending his senior trip.43  The plaintiff 
called Defendant Stear, the plaintiff’s teacher, a “prick” after school hours and 
                                                          
36 Id. at 986. 
37 Id. at 988. 
38 Id. at 989–90. 
39 Id. at 992. 
40 Id. at 989. 
41 See id. at 992. 
42 See Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 769 (9th Cir. 2006). 
43 423 F. Supp. 767, 768–69 (W.D. Pa. 1976).   
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off school property at a shopping center several miles from the high school.44  
The plaintiff was given a three-day, in-school suspension as punishment for his 
actions, including a prohibition from participating in any extra-curricular activ-
ities.45  Later, the plaintiff was suspended for an additional eleven days.46  The 
court determined the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not violated.47  
Defining fighting words as “‘those which by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,’” the court posited that 
fighting words—like prick—were not protected by the Constitution.48  
The Seventh Circuit examined the application of the substantial disruption 
standard to out-of-school speech in Boucher v. School Board.49  The plaintiff, 
high school student Justin Boucher, published an underground paper, The Last, 
which contained an article detailing to other students how to hack into the 
school’s computer system.50  The plaintiff’s conduct occurred outside of 
school.51  The publication required computer technicians to take precautions to 
protect against a potential breach incited by the article.52  Based upon the neces-
sity of the technicians’ services, the court found that a disruption had occurred 
in the school and could occur in the future.53  The court expanded the substantial 
disruption standard to include instances in which “school authorities ‘have rea-
son to believe’ that the expression will be disruptive.”54  Because the article 
advocated for a disruption, the court found that the speech was not protected by 
the First Amendment.55   
The Eighth Circuit examined the substantial disruption standard in D.J.M. 
v. Hannibal Pubic School District.56  D.J.M., a high school student, was sus-
                                                          
44 Id. at 769. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 770. 
47 Id. at 771. 
48 Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).  The court also noted that 
lewd and obscene speech, and profane and libelous speech were not protected by the First Amendment.  
Id. 
49 See generally 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998). 
50 Id. at 822. 
51 Id. at 824. 
52 Id. at 827. 
53 Id.  The court also noted that, in addition to the previously published material, the article stated 
additional instruction would be provided at a later date.  Id. 
54 Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988)). 
55 Id. at 828–29. 
56 See generally 647 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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pended after discussing obtaining a gun and shooting other students with a class-
mate over instant messenger.57  Subsequently, the school suspended him for the 
remainder of the school year.58  D.J.M. brought suit against the school district 
alleging the punishment violated his First Amendment rights.59  Based upon the 
facts of the case, including that D.J.M. had access to a handgun and was con-
sidering shooting certain students, as well as the recent threat of school violence, 
the court found the student’s comments constituted a true threat.60  Therefore, 
D.J.M.’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment.61  The court noted 
that a true threat is “‘a statement that a reasonable recipient would have inter-
preted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.’”62  
Accordingly, the court held that the school’s punishment of D.J.M.’s speech 
was not a violation of the First Amendment.63 
Public high schools are limited in their ability to regulate student’s speech 
occurring outside of school.  When a student’s speech creates an actual or a 
reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption to the school environment, a pub-
lic high school may regulate its students’ speech.  Generally, this speech takes 
the form of true threats and fighting words.  The above case law demonstrates 
an extension of Tinker to out-of-school speech and the public high school’s abil-
ity to regulate the speech. 
 iii. Online Speech 
After the advent of the Internet, out-of-school speech has gained the ability 
to creep into the school environment.  In an early decision regarding student 
speech on the Internet, the court found the out-of-school speech, a webpage cre-
ated by the plaintiff, did not cause a substantial disruption and such a disruption 
was not reasonably foreseeable.64  In Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School Dis-
trict, the school punished the plaintiff, Brandon Beussink, for creating a website 
expressing views critical of the Woodland School District, which included vul-
gar language.65  The plaintiff created the website in his home and used no school 
                                                          
57 Id. at 756. 
58 Id. at 757. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 762–64.   
61 Id. at 764. 
62 Id. at 762 (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
63 Id. at 757. 
64 Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
65 Id. at 1177. 
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resources or school time.66  The court held that the plaintiff’s “provocative and 
challenging speech” was the type intended to be protected by the First Amend-
ment; thus, the school violated this right when it prohibited and punished the 
speech.67   
In a state supreme court case, J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, the 
court discussed whether a student’s punishment for creating a website with of-
fensive and threatening comments violated the student’s First Amendment right 
to free speech.68  The plaintiff, J.S., created a website entitled “Teacher Sux,” 
and the school subsequently suspended him.69  In addition to a disclosure state-
ment prohibiting school officials from viewing the site and visitors from report-
ing the site, the website included “derogatory, profane, offensive and threaten-
ing comments” directed at various school personnel.70  The court listed factors 
to be used for determining whether speech, in the totality of the circumstances, 
was to be considered a true threat.71  These factors included: 
 
how the recipient and other listeners reacted to the alleged 
threat; whether the threat was conditional; whether it was com-
municated directly to its victim; whether the makers of the 
threat had made similar statements to the victim on other occa-
sions; and whether the victim had reason to believe that the 
maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence.72  
 
 In regards to the threatening nature of the speech, the court determined that 
the speech did not constitute a true threat because it did not show a serious in-
tention to cause harm.73  However, the website created a substantial disruption 
to the school environment.74  Although the website was created out-of-school, 
because it was accessed from a school computer, the court viewed the speech as 
                                                          
66 Id.  The school was notified of the existence of the page by a fellow student who was upset with 
the plaintiff.  Id. at 1177–78. 
67 Id. at 1182. 
68 See generally 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).   
69 Id. at 851–52.  The website contained pages eliciting that a specific teacher should be fired, chas-
tising the teacher’s physical appearance, equating the teacher to Hitler, and listing reasons why the 
teacher should die.  Id. at 851. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 857.   
72 Id. at 858. 
73 Id. at 859. 
74 Id. at 869. 
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occurring in-school.75  The court noted that an important difference between the 
situations presented in Tinker and the “complex multi-media web site [sic], ac-
cessible to fellow students, teachers, and the world.”76  Further, the speech’s 
direct and indirect effects included the need for three substitute teachers, anxiety 
experienced by students and teachers, and disruption of the school’s educational 
goals.77  Based upon the speech’s effects, the court found that a substantial dis-
ruption to the school environment had occurred; therefore, the plaintiff’s pun-
ishment was constitutional.78   
In J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, the plaintiff, J.S., created a spoof 
Myspace profile about her middle school principal, James McGonigle, and was 
suspended.79  The profile did not specifically identify McGonigle, but contained 
his school photograph.80  Additionally, the profile contained crude and vulgar 
language.81  However, the court found the profile could not be taken seriously 
based upon its outrageousness.82  The court premised its determination partly on 
the “private” nature of the profile—only J.S.’s friends could access its con-
tents.83  The court held that the profile developed out-of-school created no sub-
stantial or reasonably foreseeable disruption to the school environment; there-
fore, the punishment violated J.S.’s First Amendment rights.84  
In Kowalski v. Berkeley County School, the plaintiff, Kara Kowalski, 
brought suit against defendants alleging that they violated her First Amendment 
free speech rights for punishing her for creating a Myspace webpage named 
“Students Against Sluts [sic] Herpes,” targeted at another student.85  Because 
the speech constituted an “orchestrate[d] . . . targeted attack on a classmate,” it 
created a substantial disruption to the school environment.86  Therefore, the 
                                                          
75 Id. at 865. 
76 Id. at 864. 
77 Id. at 869. 
78 Id.  
79 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011).  The only identifying information present on the profile was a 
picture of the principal.  Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 921. 
83 Id. at 929. 
84 Id. at 920.  In a similar case, the court found that punishing a student for the creation of a fake 
Myspace profile representing the student’s principal made outside-of-school violated the First Amend-
ment.  Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2011).  The court held that 
although the profile contained offensive language, it did not substantially disrupt the school environ-
ment.  Id. 
85 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011). 
86 Id.  
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court held that the punishment, a five-day suspension accompanied by a ninety-
day “social suspension,”87 did not violate the First Amendment.88   
Regulating students’ speech occurring online creates difficulties for public 
high schools because of its ability to pervade the school’s walls.  A public high 
school may regulate students’ Internet speech occurring outside the school en-
vironment when it pervades the school walls and becomes substantially disrup-
tive or is reasonably foreseeable to become substantially disruptive to the school 
environment.89  Speech causing or reasonably likely to cause a substantial dis-
ruption to the school environment includes true threats and attacks targeting 
classmates.  However, if the speech contributes to the free exchange of ideas 
that a school is meant to promote or is too outrageous to be taken seriously, a 
public high school cannot regulate the speech without violating the First 
Amendment.  Further, in some instances, a school may violate the First Amend-
ment when it regulates speech contained on a private social media profile if the 
speech does not cause or create a reasonably foreseeable chance of a substantial 
disruption to the school environment.  Courts examining the pervasiveness of 
Internet speech have found regulation of student speech constitutional when the 
speech caused a substantial disruption in-school similar to the disturbance 
caused when the speech itself occurs within the confines of the school. 
b. Overall Development of the Tinker Standard 
 Based upon the foregoing case law, public high schools may prohibit and 
punish student speech that is substantially disruptive or creates a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption to the school environment, including 
threats and fighting words, without running afoul of the First Amendment.90  
While a school may not regulate students’ out-of-school speech as significantly 
as a student’s in-school speech, the advent of the Internet allows for out-of-
school speech to have the potential to transform into in-school speech or in-
creased dissemination of the speech to create a substantial disruption to the 
                                                          
87 Under the social suspension, Kowalski could not attend school events if she was not a direct 
participant.  Id. at 569.  Additionally, she was prohibited from attending the Charm Review and partic-
ipating as a cheerleader for the remainder of the school year.  Id. 
88 See id. at 572. 
89 See generally id.  When evaluating a case involving a student’s website featuring fellow students’ 
fake obituaries, the court emphasized that the speech occurred “entirely outside of the school’s super-
vision or control,” making its regulation unconstitutional.  Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).  While not dispositive, the court further noted the posts 
were inspired by an in-school assignment, arguably indirectly acknowledging that speech stemming 
from classroom work would be protected pursuant to the First Amendment.  Id. at 1089. 
90 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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school environment. 
2. Bethel School District v. Fraser: The Vulgar, Lewd, and Obscene Standard 
A public high school may regulate students’ vulgar, lewd, obscene, and 
plainly offensive speech occurring at school; however, the regulation of such 
out-of-school speech is limited to instances in which the speech causes a sub-
stantial disruption to the educational environment. 
a. Interpretation of Fraser 
In the United States Supreme Court case Bethel School District v. Fraser, 
the plaintiff, Matthew Fraser, was given a three-day suspension and prohibited 
from being a graduation speaker after he gave a speech containing “elaborate, 
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor[s]” at a school-sanctioned event.91  The 
Court held that Fraser’s speech was not protected under the First Amendment 
because the speech was not political, and the school had an interest in prohibit-
ing “vulgar speech and lewd conduct” that it considers “wholly inconsistent 
with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”92  Accordingly, a 
public high school may prohibit and punish students’ vulgar, lewd, “obscene,”93 
and plainly offensive speech occurring in the school environment.94 
b. Connecting Fraser to Tinker 
Although the Supreme Court has not issued additional decisions following 
Fraser, federal appellate and district courts, as well as state courts, have ana-
lyzed similar issues, providing insight into the potential scope of the school’s 
ability to regulate obscene, vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive speech.   
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, the plaintiff, Zachariah 
Paul, a high school student and track team member, composed a list of charac-
teristics of his athletic director, Robert Bozzuto, at his home, which contained 
inaccurate information, including the size of Bozzuto’s genitals.95  After another 
student brought the list into school, Paul was suspended for ten days.96  Paul 
                                                          
91 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). 
92 Id. at 685–86. 
93 Id. at 678.  The high school prohibited obscene language in a rule providing, “[c]onduct which 
materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of 
obscene, profane language or gestures.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
94 Id. at 685. 
95 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
96 Id. at 449. 
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sued, alleging his punishment violated his First Amendment right to free 
speech.97  In addition to holding that Paul’s punishment violated the First 
Amendment because his speech did not cause substantial disruption, the court 
found that the speech, although lewd, vulgar, and profane, occurred out-of-
school; thus, removing it from the auspices of speech that the school may regu-
late pursuant to the First Amendment.98  Additionally, even though he was a 
member of the track team, he was punished as though he was a general student 
because he was not acting within the scope of his position as an athlete.99 
In T.V. v. Smith-Green Community School Corp., two female high school 
volleyball players received six-game suspensions after posting risqué pictures 
on one of the student’s Myspace and Facebook accounts.100  The photographs at 
issue included the girls posing with phallic-shaped lollipops, as well as in sex-
ually suggestive poses.101  The court found that the photographs were meant to 
be humorous and the school officials’ disapproval of the pictures solidified the 
belief they were intended to be funny.102  Further, the court determined that the 
photographs did not create a reasonably foreseeable likelihood of a substantial 
disruption to the school environment.103  Ultimately, the court held that the pho-
tos were protected by the First Amendment; therefore, the school’s punishment 
was unconstitutional.104  
The foregoing case law demonstrates a public high school’s ability to regu-
late its students’ speech without violating the First Amendment when that 
speech is vulgar, obscene, lewd, or plainly offensive and occurs in school.  How-
ever, to regulate such speech occurring out-of-school, the speech must cause or 
create a reasonably foreseeable likelihood of a substantial disruption to the 
school environment. 
3.  Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier: School-Sponsored Publications 
 
Although regulation of student-athletes’ speech occurring through a school-
sponsored medium may not be as common as regulation of the speech causing 
                                                          
97 Id. at 450. 
98 Id. at 456. 
99 See generally id. 
100 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 771–72 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
101 Id. at 772. 
102 Id. at 776. 
103 Id. at 779 (noting the photographs did not fall under the purview of obscenity or child pornogra-
phy). 
104 Id. at 781. 
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a substantial disruption and lewd, vulgar, obscene, or plainly offensive speech, 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier represents the United States Supreme 
Court’s third major area of speech that a public high school may regulate.105 
A public high school may regulate speech when the medium used to distrib-
ute the speech is a school-sponsored publication.106  In Kuhlmeier, student-staff 
members of the school newspaper alleged that the removal of articles from the 
newspaper violated their First Amendment right to free speech.107  The articles 
discussed the school’s students’ experiences with teen pregnancy and the impact 
divorce had on students.108  The Court determined that the school had the ability 
to reasonably regulate what was published in the school newspaper and that the 
regulation served a valid educational purpose; thus, the removal of the articles 
did not violate the students’ right to free speech.109 
B.  Application of Student Speech Regulation Standards to Student-Athletes 
A student-athlete may be held to a higher standard of conduct than other 
students based upon the student-athlete’s participation in interscholastic sports.  
The United States Supreme Court noted in dicta that student-athletes are entitled 
to a decreased level of privacy expectations because “[b]y choosing to ‘go out 
for the team,’ they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even 
higher than that imposed on students generally.”110  Earlier in its opinion, the 
Court compared the Fourth Amendment rights of public high school students to 
their First Amendment rights stating that the rights “are different in public 
schools than elsewhere.”111  Therefore, based upon its discussion, the Court, if 
presented with an issue involving student-athletes’ right to free speech, would 
likely find that student-athletes’ expectation of free speech is lessened by vol-
untarily participating in interscholastic athletics.112  Though the Supreme Court 
has not directly addressed the issue of the impact of a public high school’s reg-
ulation of its student-athletes’ speech upon the student-athletes’ First Amend-
ment right to free speech, lower federal and state courts have analyzed this issue 
and provided helpful guidance.  
                                                          
105 See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
106 See id. at 276. 
107 Id. at 262. 
108 Id. at 263. 
109 Id. at 270, 273. 
110 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995). 
111 Id. at 656. 
112 Id. at 657. 
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1. Sample Cases  
In Seamons v. Snow, the Tenth Circuit analyzed whether the plaintiff’s dis-
missal from the high school’s football team for refusing to apologize for report-
ing to school officials and the police that his teammates assaulted him violated 
his First Amendment right to free speech.113  The court found that the dismissal 
was a violation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment right because a student-ath-
lete may not be punished for the truthful reporting of illegal or egregious behav-
ior of his teammates to school officials or the appropriate authorities.114   
In Wildman v. Marshalltown School District, the Eighth Circuit was 
charged with determining whether a student-athlete’s First Amendment right to 
free speech was violated after she was removed from her high school basketball 
team for circulating a letter calling for action against the team’s coach.115  The 
student-athlete alleged that conditioning her ability to continue participating in 
interscholastic basketball on her giving a public apology to the team and coach, 
and her subsequent dismissal violated her First Amendment right to free 
speech.116  The court determined that the dismissal did not violate the student-
athlete’s First Amendment right because the letter displayed insubordination 
and disrespect, and the school and coach had an interest in maintaining an at-
mosphere free of disruption and one of sportsmanship.117   
The Ninth Circuit examined whether suspending student-athletes from the 
school’s basketball team as punishment for complaining about their coach and 
refusing to board a game bus constituted a violation of their right to freedom of 
speech.118  In response to their coach’s verbally abusive and intimidating behav-
ior, the student-athletes signed a petition calling for the coach’s resignation and 
refused to board a bus for a game.119  The students sued, alleging that their sus-
pension from the basketball team as a punishment for their conduct violated 
their First Amendment right to free speech.120  The court held that suspending 
                                                          
113 206 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir. 2000). 
114 See id. at 1030–31. 
115 249 F.3d 768, 769–70 (8th Cir. 2001). 
116 Id. at 769. 
117 Id. at 771–72.  The court also noted that the punishment did not interfere with the student’s 
education.  Id. at 772. 
118 Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 759 (9th Cir. 2006). 
119 Id. at 760–762.  
120 Id. at 759. 
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the student-athletes for signing the petition was a violation of free speech be-
cause the speech was “pure speech,” akin to that protected in Tinker.121  How-
ever, the court found the student-athletes’ refusal to board the bus materially 
disrupted the school environment, as extracurricular activities—including 
sports—are “a bona fide school activity.”122  Therefore, punishment for this con-
duct was not a violation of the student-athletes’ right to free speech.123   
In Lowery v. Euverard, the plaintiffs, after signing a petition to remove their 
football coach, were dismissed from the football team.124  The plaintiffs brought 
suit, alleging that their dismissal violated their First Amendment right to free 
speech.125  In its decision, the court noted that “[r]estrictions that would be in-
appropriate for the student body at large may be appropriate in the context of 
voluntary athletic programs.”126  In holding that the student-athletes’ punish-
ment did not violate the First Amendment, the court noted that schools have a 
duty to prevent substantial disruptions.127   
2. Summary of Student-Athlete Cases  
By voluntarily participating in interscholastic sports, student-athletes sub-
mit themselves to more rigorous regulation of their speech than the general stu-
dent population.  In addition to regulating speech pursuant to the substantial 
disruption standard and vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech, a 
public high school may regulate student-athletes’ speech when it is insubordi-
nate or unsportsmanlike.  However, a school may not prohibit a student-athletes’ 
speech regarding allegations of illegal, abusive, intimidating, or egregious con-
duct by other student-athletes, coaches, or other associated personnel when the 
allegation is made in good faith.  Further, interscholastic athletic events are con-
sidered to occur in-school for the purpose of analyzing student-athletes’ speech.  
Therefore, public high schools have greater latitude when regulating a student-
athlete’s speech than the speech of general students.128 
                                                          
121 Id. at 764. 
122 Id. at 769–770. 
123 Id. at 770. 
124 497 F.3d 584, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2007). 
125 Id. at 586. 
126 Id. at 597. 
127 Id. at 596. 
128 Doninger v. Niehoff provides a useful discussion pertaining to the increased regulation of stu-
dents holding certain positions in the school community.  See generally 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).  
The plaintiff signed and agreed to the school district’s written policies regarding students and student 
officers’ conduct, binding her to comply with the restrictions.  Id. at 339.  The plaintiff wrote a blog 
post during her tenure as junior class secretary chastising the school administration and inciting students 
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Additionally, student-athletes’ punishments for violations of a public high 
school’s regulations of student or student-athlete speech may include restricted 
access to participate in interscholastic sports beyond the effect of the education-
based punishment,129 whereas punishment of a student in the general population 
may only affect areas of that student’s education.  Based upon the preceding 
case law, student-athletes may be regulated to the same or greater extent as the 
general student population without the public high school violating the student-
athletes’ right to free speech. 
IV.  APPLICATION TO REGULATION OF STUDENT-ATHLETES’ USE OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA 
A public high school’s ability to regulate student-athletes’ social media us-
age, while subject to some limitations, is more expansive than the ability to reg-
ulate the usage of the general student population.  
Regarding the general student population, a public high school’s ability to 
regulate student speech is limited to speech satisfying the substantial disruption 
standard; speech that is vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive; or speech 
occurring in a school-sponsored publication.  Overall, unless the speech invades 
the school environment causing a substantial disruption, regulation of social 
media speech may be even more limited than speech occurring via more tradi-
tional means.  Schools may regulate out-of-school speech when that speech 
causes a substantial disruption to the school environment or such a disruption is 
reasonably foreseeable to occur.  Schools may regulate in-school speech when 
it causes, or would foreseeably cause, a substantial disruption to the school en-
vironment or is vulgar, obscene, plainly offensive, or lewd.130  Overall, schools 
and athletic departments must balance the need to maintain the school’s educa-
tional environment against the free speech rights of student-athletes.131 
Regarding out-of-school speech, a public high school may regulate its stu-
dent-athletes’ social media usage if the posts involved constitute speech that 
actually causes or creates a reasonably foreseeable, substantial disruption to the 
school environment, including on the playing field.  Although this regulation 
                                                          
to take action.  Id. at 339–41.  The court found that the plaintiff’s punishment did not violate the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 351. 
129 “Education-based” punishments are those originating in the general school environment, such as 
a student being suspended or expelled from the educational institution. 
130 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. 
Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Doninger, 642 F.3d 334; Killion v. Franklin Reg’l. Sch. Dist., 136 
F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
131 See generally Mayer, supra note 25. 
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may be stricter than that of the general student population, as shown in the pre-
ceding case law, the actual regulation and punishment of student-athletes’ 
speech using social media may prove more difficult in reality than it would the-
oretically seem.  Courts narrowly construe what conduct is considered to be 
substantially disruptive, making it more difficult for a public high school to limit 
the student-athletes’ speech.132  Additionally, without a Supreme Court decision 
regarding the scope of the public high school’s ability to regulate its students’, 
and by extension student-athletes’, speech occurring via social media creates 
further impediments to the high school’s determination of how to regulate this 
speech within the confines of the First Amendment. 
However, public high schools have considerably greater latitude when reg-
ulating its student-athletes’ speech occurring via social media in-school.  
Schools may prohibit and punish student-athletes’ speech if it creates or could 
foreseeably create a substantial disruption in the school environment; is lewd, 
obscene, vulgar, or plainly offensive; is unsportsmanlike; or is insubordinate.133  
Further, because the school environment extends past the boundaries of the 
physical structure to the playing field, a school may regulate its student-athletes’ 
use of social media at interscholastic athletic events to the same extent it does 
within the physical school building.134  Based upon the extension of scope of in-
school speech to the athletic event itself, it is possible that a public high school 
may even regulate its student-athletes’ speech via social media during the 
team’s transportation to and from the event.135 
Subject to the above guidelines, a public high school may regulate its stu-
dent-athletes’ speech that occurs via their use of social media platforms. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Student-athletes’ use of social media is a phenomena that is not likely to 
disappear from the purview of schools in the near future.  Therefore, the issue 
of public high schools’ regulation of its student-athletes’ social media use must 
be addressed.  Because public schools are state actors subject to the First 
Amendment, they must ensure their instituted policies do not infringe upon the 
student-athletes’ right to free speech. 
The seemingly broad ability of schools to regulate their student-athletes’ 
                                                          
132 See generally T.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011).  
133 However, it should be noted that it is unclear whether insubordinate or unsportsmanlike speech 
may be regulated when it occurs outside of school.  See generally Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 
249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001). 
134 See generally Tinker , 393 U.S. 503 ; Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
135 See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Lowery, 497 F.3d 584. 
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social media use is deceptive.  Based upon the case law involving students’ use 
of social media, most speech is protected pursuant to the First Amendment.  As 
a result, public high schools are limited in the circumstances when they may 
regulate student-athletes’ social media use.  High school athletic departments 
should focus on educating students about the dangers of social media as a part 
of the school’s social media policy.  Additionally, the school may prohibit stu-
dent-athletes from posting material that is substantially disruptive to the school 
environment; vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive; insubordinate; or un-
sportsmanlike.  The school must also be aware of the instances in which a 
school’s regulation of social media use is impacted by whether the speech oc-
curs in-school or out-of-school. 
Without a United States Supreme Court decision, the determination of the 
scope of the public high school’s ability to constitutionally regulate its student-
athletes’ social media usage is a delicate balancing act.  While the bounds of the 
school’s ability to prohibit and punish its student-athletes’ social media use re-
main unclear, there is no doubt that a public high school may regulate its stu-
dent-athletes’ social media use in a limited capacity. 
Overall, a public high school has the difficult task of balancing its interests 
in maintaining a school environment consistent with its educational purpose 
with the First Amendment free speech rights of its student-athletes.  Schools 
should formulate a social media policy for their student-athletes that clearly dic-
tates the unacceptable uses of social media platforms both in-school and out-of-
school.  Ultimately, the issue of student-athletes’ use of social media is here to 
stay; therefore, public high schools should address this problem as quickly as 
practicable. 
 
